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INTRODUCTION
Economic well-being refers to the household’s command over, and access to, the 
goods and services produced in a modern market economy during a given period of 
time. The magnitude of the command or access that can be exercised by the household 
is approximated by an income measure, since household income should, in principle, 
reﬂ  ect the resources available to the household for facilitating current consumption 
or acquiring assets. Traditionally, household money income is used as a measure that 
reﬂ  ects such command.
Our aim in this paper is to propose a new measure of economic well-being. Gross 
money income (MI), the most widely used measure of economic well-being in the 
United States and several advanced capitalist countries, has been criticized on several 
grounds. The landmark report by the Canberra Group, a group of international experts 
on household income statistics, recommended, among other things, that estimates 
of in-kind social beneﬁ  ts need to be added and tax burden subtracted from money 
income to arrive at a better measure of household economic well-being [Canberra 
Group, 2001]. In a welcome and signiﬁ  cant shift, the U.S. Census Bureau placed its 
“experimental measures of income” on par with gross money income (MI) in its an-
nual reports [DeNavas-Walt et al., 2003]. The Bureau’s most comprehensive measure, 
which we refer to as extended income (EI), is a better approximation of a household’s 
command over commodities than MI, which is the most widely used ofﬁ  cial measure. 
EI is an after-tax measure of income. It expands the deﬁ  nitions of income from work 
and income from wealth. Furthermore, it has a better accounting of the government’s 
role in household economic well-being. 
The EI and MI measures seek to estimate the command over commodities. Al-
though commodities are of critical importance, they form only a portion of the entire 444 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
set of goods and services available to households. The state plays a crucial role in the 
direct provisioning of the “necessaries and conveniences of life” (to use Adam Smith’s 
famous expression), such as public education and highways (“public consumption”). 
Nonmarket household work, such as childcare, cooking, and cleaning, also provides 
the necessaries and conveniences of life (“household production”).
The Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW) is a more com-
prehensive measure than the two ofﬁ  cial measures. We include estimates of public 
consumption and household production in our measure, components that are excluded 
in most available measures of economic well-being. We also include estimates of 
long-run beneﬁ  ts from the ownership of wealth (other than homes) in the form of an 
imputed lifetime annuity, a procedure that, in our view, is superior to considering only 
current income from assets. Finally, we include an estimate of consumption taxes, 
in addition to income, payroll and property taxes, to arrive at a fuller picture of the 
household tax burden.
The argument that conventional measures are inadequate as a measure of eco-
nomic well-being because of their omission of elements such as household production 
or their treatment of income from ﬁ  nancial assets is hardly novel. In fact, there exists 
a substantial body of research, including the pioneering work being done at the Census 
Bureau itself, which has attempted to include, in addition to money income, one or 
the other elements mentioned to arrive at a more complete measure of income. What 
is novel about the LIMEW is that while previous research has typically attempted 
to include the effect of one element or the other in isolation, we integrate all of them 
simultaneously, into a comprehensive measure.
There are three key motivations behind constructing the LIMEW. First, trends in 
well-being can be sensitive to how we choose to measure well-being. A broader measure 
of well-being might be better guide to actual trends in the economic determinants of 
the standard of living. While adding new components such as public consumption and 
household production to conventional measures of well-being is bound to raise the 
measured level of household well-being, it is also important to know: by how much? 
This might serve as a starting point to a quantitative assessment of the importance 
of non-market provisioning in sustaining living standards.
Another motivation behind developing the LIMEW is to study disparities among 
households in key demographic groups. By focusing only on money income, we might 
end up with a partial picture of the advantage or disadvantage faced by particular 
groups in one or more dimensions of well-being. For example, costs incurred by the 
government in paying public pensions to the elderly (e.g., Social Security payments) 
are included in their money income while the costs incurred by the government in the 
education of the young is not counted as a part of their economic well-being. Admit-
tedly, there are problems in quantifying the latter but it is hard to believe that the 
best estimate of it is zero. Finally, the LIMEW is also motivated by the consideration 
that economic inequality is broader than inequality in earnings, the main focus of most 
academic studies and the main driving force behind the changes in the inequality of 
money income. As one would expect, household production and public consumption 
are distributed much more equally than earnings among households. On the other 
hand, inequality in the ownership of assets is a crucial determining factor in overall 445 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
inequality. As is well known, the inequality in wealth is generally much higher than 
that in income or earnings. Including an estimate of the long-run beneﬁ  ts from wealth 
in the measure of well-being will therefore boost measured inequality. In sum, our 
understanding of the extent and nature of group inequalities and overall inequality 
depends on the measure of well-being. 
We begin by describing brieﬂ  y the methodology for the LIMEW. The sources of 
data and methods used are described in the appendix. In the subsequent section, we 
provide estimates that demonstrate that the economic fortunes of the average house-
hold over the 1990s appear to have followed substantially different trends depending 
on the yardstick of well-being used. The next section compares results based on the 
LIMEW and conventional measures for households in some key demographic groups. 
We discuss, in some detail, how the different components of the measures (income 
from wealth, government transfers etc.) contribute toward widening or narrowing 
disparities among groups. In the following section, we discuss the overall distribution 
of economic well-being. We compare our ﬁ  ndings regarding inequality based on the 
LIMEW with those based on the ofﬁ  cial measures, highlighting the role of the indi-
vidual components in shaping the differences in ﬁ  ndings. Some policy implications 
are discussed in the concluding section.
COMPONENTS OF THE LIMEW
The LIMEW is constructed as the sum of the following components (see Table 1): 
base income; income from wealth; net government expenditures (transfers and public 
consumption, net of taxes); and household production.1 
Base income is simply gross money income less the sum of property income (inter-
est, dividends, and rents) and government cash transfers (e.g., Social Security beneﬁ  ts) 
plus employer contributions for health insurance. Earnings make up the overwhelm-
ing portion of base income. Adding employer contributions to health insurance, by far 
the most important type of employer-provided in-kind compensation for work in the 
United States, expands the deﬁ  nition of income from work. The remainder of base 
income consists of pensions and other small items, such as interpersonal transfers 
and workers’ compensation paid by the private sector. 
The second item added to base money income is imputed income from wealth. In 
the ofﬁ  cial gross money income measure, property-type income consists of the actual 
receipts of interest, dividends, and rent. From our perspective, the actual, annual 
property income is an incomplete measure of the economic well-being derived from 
the ownership of assets. Real assets, such as houses, typically last for several years 
and yield services to their owners, thereby freeing up resources otherwise spent on 
housing. Financial assets, can, under normal conditions, be a source of economic se-
curity in addition to property-type income. 
Our approach to the valuation of income from wealth is different from the meth-
ods suggested in the literature (e.g., Weisbrod and Hansen [1968]) in two signiﬁ  cant 
ways. First, we distinguish between home and nonhome wealth. Housing is a universal 
need and home ownership frees the owner from the obligation of paying rent, leaving 
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beneﬁ  ts from owner-occupied housing are reckoned in terms of the replacement cost 
of the services derived from it (i.e., a rental equivalent).2 Second, we estimate the ben-
eﬁ  ts from nonhome wealth using a variant of the standard lifetime annuity method.3 
We calculate an annuity based on a given amount of wealth, an interest rate, and life 
expectancy. The annuity is the same for the remaining life of the wealth holder and 
the terminal wealth is zero. (In the case of households with multiple adults, we use the 
maximum of the life expectancy of the head of household and spouse in the annuity 
formula.) We modify the standard procedure by accounting for differences in portfolio 
composition across households. Instead of using a single interest rate for all assets, 
we use a weighted average of asset-speciﬁ  c and historic real rates of return,4 where 
the weights are the proportions of the different assets in a household’s total wealth.
 TABLE  1
  A Comparison of the LIMEW and Extended Income (EI)
 LIMEW  EI
Money income (MI)  Money income (MI)
Less:  Property income and Government cash   Less:  Property income and Government cash  
   transfers     transfers
      
Plus:   In-kind compensation from work  Plus:  In-kind compensation from work
    Employer contributions for health       Employer contributions for health  
   insurance     insurance
 
Equals: Base  income  Equals: Base income
Plus:  Income from wealth  Plus: Income  from  wealth
    Annuity from nonhome wealth      Property income and realized capital
           gains (losses)
    Imputed rent on owner-occupied housing      Imputed return on home equity 
Less: Taxes  Less: Taxes
   Income  taxes1     Income  taxes
   Payroll  taxes1     Payroll  taxes
   Property  taxes1     Property  taxes
   Consumption  taxes 
Plus: Cash  transfers1  Plus: Cash  transfers
Plus: Noncash  transfers1, 2  Plus: Noncash  transfers
Plus: Public  consumption 
Plus: Household  production 
Equals: LIMEW  Equals: EI 
Note: (1) The amounts estimated by the Census Bureau and used in EI are modiﬁ  ed to make the aggregates 
consistent with the NIPA estimates. (2) The government-cost approach is used: the Census Bureau uses 
the fungible value method for valuing Medicare and Medicaid in EI. The main difference between the two 
methods is that, while the fungible value method assigns an income value for a beneﬁ  t according to the 
recipient’s level of income, the government-cost approach assigns an income value for a beneﬁ  t irrespective 
of the recipient’s income.447 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
The third item that we add to base money income is net government expenditures—
the difference between government expenditures incurred on behalf of households and 
taxes paid by households. Our approach to determine expenditures and taxes may be 
called the social accounting approach [Hicks, 1946; Lakin, 2002, 43−46]. 
Government expenditures included in the LIMEW consist of cash transfers, non-
cash transfers, and public consumption. These expenditures, in general, are derived 
from the National Income and Product Accounts [NIPA Tables 3.12 and 3.15.5]. The 
social accounting approach to government expenditures yields the generally accepted 
conclusion in the case of government cash transfers: they are to be considered entirely 
as part of money incomes of the recipients. Our approach to noncash transfers is that 
they must be distributed among recipients on the basis of the appropriate average 
cost incurred by the government.5 In contrast, the Census Bureau includes the “fun-
gible value” of the medical beneﬁ  ts in EI. The fungible value method is based on the 
theoretical argument that the income-value for the recipient from a given noncash 
transfer is, on the average, less than the average cost incurred by the government in 
providing that beneﬁ  t (see, for example, Canberra Group, [2001, 24,65]). In practice, 
this involves estimating how much the household could have paid for the medical 
beneﬁ  t, after meeting its expenditures on some basic items (such as food, clothing 
etc.), with the maximum payment for the medical beneﬁ  t set equal to the average 
cost incurred by the government. 
The alternative is not pursued by us primarily because of its important implica-
tion that households with incomes below the minimum threshold and participating 
in the program are presumed to receive no beneﬁ  t from a product that they actually 
consume. This is inconsistent with our goal of measuring the household’s access or 
command over products. Further, unlike the social accounting approach, the alterna-
tive method would not, by deﬁ  nition, yield the actual total government expenditure 
when aggregated across recipients. Such a feature is incompatible with our goal of 
estimating net government expenditures using a consistent methodology.
The other type of government expenditure that we include in our measure of well-
being is some public expenditures (“public consumption”). We begin with a detailed 
functional classiﬁ  cation of government expenditures on direct provisioning and exclude 
certain functions entirely because they fail to satisfy the general criterion. Most such 
functions form part of general social overhead and their major effect is to keep the ship 
of state aﬂ  oat (e.g., national defense). Expenditures under other functional categories 
also may not meet the general criterion fully because part of such expenditures can 
be considered as being incurred on behalf of the business sector (e.g., transportation). 
The household sector’s share in such expenditures can be approximated on the basis 
of information regarding its utilization or consumption of products provided via the 
expenditures. Finally, expenditures under certain functional categories are considered 
as incurred completely on behalf of the household sector (e.g., health).
In the second stage, the allocated expenditures for each functional category—pub-
lic consumption—are distributed among the households. The distribution procedures 
followed by us build on the earlier studies employing the government cost approach 
(e.g., Ruggles and O'Higgins [1981]) in that some expenditures are distributed, in 448 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the same way as the split was made between the household and other sectors, on the 
basis of estimated patterns of utilization or consumption and some expenditures are 
distributed equally among the relevant population.
The ﬁ  nal step in constructing net government expenditures is concerned with 
taxes. Our objective is to determine the distribution of actual tax payments by house-
holds in different income and demographic groups in an accounting sense rather than 
incidence in a theoretical sense. We align the aggregate taxes in the ADS (imputed 
by the Census Bureau) with their NIPA counterparts, as for expenditures. The bulk 
of the taxes paid by households falls in this group—federal and state personal income 
taxes, property taxes on owner-occupied housing, and payroll taxes (employee por-
tion). Our estimated total tax burden on households also includes state consumption 
taxes, which were not aligned with a NIPA counterpart. Taxes on corporate proﬁ  ts, 
on business-owned property, and on other businesses, as well as nontaxes, were not 
allocated to the household sector because we assumed that they were paid out of 
business sector incomes.
The ﬁ  nal item that we add to base money income is the imputed value of household 
production. Three broad categories of unpaid activities are usually included in the 
deﬁ  nition of household production: (1) core production activities, such as cooking and 
cleaning; (2) distribution activities, such as shopping for groceries and for clothing; 
and (3) childcare activities, such as caring for babies and reading to children. These 
activities are considered as “production”, since they can be assigned, generally, to 
third parties apart from the person who performs them, although third parties are 
not always a substitute of the person, especially for the third activity.6 
Our strategy for imputing the value of household production is to value the amount 
of time spent by individuals on household production using the replacement cost based 
on average earnings of domestic servants or household employees [Kuznets et al, 1941, 
432−433; Landefeld and McCulla, 2000]. Research suggests that there are signiﬁ  cant 
differences among households in the quality and composition of the “outputs” of house-
hold production as well as the efﬁ  ciency of housework [National Research Council, 
2005, Ch. 3]. The differentials are correlated with household-level characteristics (such 
as wealth) and characteristics of household members (such as the inﬂ  uence of parental 
education on childrearing practices, e.g., Yeung and Stafford [2003]). Therefore, we 
modify the replacement-cost procedure and apply to the average replacement cost a 
discount or premium that depends on how the individual (whose time is being valued) 
ranks in terms of a performance index. Ideally, the performance index should account 
for all the factors relevant in determining differentials in household production and 
the weights of the factors should be derived from a full-ﬂ  edged multivariate analysis. 
Given the absence of such research ﬁ  ndings we incorporated three key factors that 
affect efﬁ  ciency and quality differentials—household income, educational attainment, 
and time availability—with equal weights attached to each of them. 
LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF WELL-BEING
The picture regarding economic well-being is substantially different between the 
LIMEW and the ofﬁ  cial measures. By construction, MI and EI have average values 449 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
less than the LIMEW. The median values of the ofﬁ  cial measures amount to approxi-
mately 60 percent of the LIMEW in 2001 and approximately 65 percent in 1989 (see 
Table 2). The three measures also show different rates of change. The most favorable 
rate of increase is given by the LIMEW (12.2 percent), followed by EI (6.4 percent) 
and MI (2.1 percent).
 TABLE  2
  Economic Well-Being by Measure of Well-Being
        
  Median values (dollar amounts in 2001 $)
    1989 1995 2000 2001
Levy measures            
  LIMEW  64,150 64,645 70,841 72,004
 PFI1  48,168 49,860 53,607 54,629
 LIMEW-C2  40,583 41,548 44,631 45,392
Ofﬁ  cial measures            
  Money income (MI)  41,310  39,510  43,195  42,198
  Extended income (EI)  40,623  40,811  43,835  43,206
      
   Percentage change
    1989-95 1995-00 2000-01  1989-2001
Levy measures            
  LIMEW  0.8 9.6 1.6 12.2
  PFI  3.5 7.5 1.9 13.4
  LIMEW-C  2.4 7.4 1.7 11.9
Ofﬁ  cial measures            
  Money income (MI)  -4.4  9.3  -2.3  2.1
  Extended income (EI)  0.5  7.4  -1.4  6.4
1. Post-Fiscal Income (PFI) = LIMEW less the value of household production.
2. LIMEW–C = LIMEW less the value of household production and public consumption.
Table 2 also shows two measures that are related to the LIMEW. As noted in the 
introduction, EI and MI are measures that seek to estimate the magnitude of the com-
mand over commodities. If we exclude public consumption and household production 
from the LIMEW, we arrive at a similar measure: LIMEW−C. EI is particularly suited 
to be compared with LIMEW−C because both estimates are post-tax, post-transfer 
measures of economic well-being. The addition of public consumption to LIMEW−C 
results in a “post-ﬁ  scal income” (PFI) measure that reﬂ  ects the effect of net government 
expenditures, which includes public consumption in addition to transfer payments net 
of taxes. Similar to the LIMEW, these measures also show much higher percentage 
increases between 1989 and 2001, as compared to the ofﬁ  cial measures.
The differences in the picture of well-being that is conveyed by the various mea-
sures are due to their individual components (e.g., public provisioning is included in 
the LIMEW, but not in the ofﬁ  cial measures) and the manner in which the compo-
nents are included in the measure (e.g., income from nonhome wealth is included as 
a lifetime annuity in the LIMEW, but as the sum of property income and realized net 
capital gains in EI). As it turns out, the differences in the level of mean values across 
the measures are similar to the differences in the median values. As shown in Table 
3, the rates of change in the mean values of the measures between 1989 and 2001 450 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
are also substantially different: MI and EI grew at comparable rates (14.2 and 12.3 
percent respectively) while the LIMEW grew much faster at 22.8 percent.
 TABLE  3
  Change in economic well-being, 1989 to 2001
  (All dollar amounts are mean values in 2001 dollars)
 LIMEW  Extended  income  (EI)
       Contribution      Contribution
   1989  2001  to change  1989  2001  to change 
      (in percent)       (in percent)
Base income  45,322  53,179  10.0  45,322  53,179  16.6
Income from wealth  14,396  22,222  9.9  8,678  8,571  -0.2
Net gov. expenditure  1,064  869  -0.2  -6,560  -8,488  -4.1
 Transfers  7,108  9,157  2.6  5,408  6,593  2.5
  Public consumption  7,416  8,697  1.6         
 Taxes  -13,461  -16,985  -4.5  -11,968 -15,081  -6.6
Household production  18,002  20,456  3.1         
Total 78,783  96,726  22.8  47,440  53,262  12.3
Addendum:                  
Money income  50,981  58,213  14.2         
In an accounting sense the percentage change in an income measure can be ex-
pressed as the sum of the contributions by the individual components. As shown in 
Table 3, base income is the only identical component in concept and amount for both 
the LIMEW and EI. In the LIMEW, base income accounted for 10 percentage points 
of the total change (22.8 percentage points). Base income’s contribution to the change 
in EI exceeded the total change in EI (12.3 percentage points), but it was offset by the 
negative contributions from income from wealth and net government expenditures 
(transfers, net of taxes). While the contribution of net government expenditures to 
the change was negative in both measures, the effect was smaller in the LIMEW ow-
ing to the inclusion of public consumption. In contrast to EI, the component reﬂ  ect-
ing income from wealth in the LIMEW showed a strong positive contribution to the 
change in economic well-being that was almost as large as the contribution from base 
income. This reﬂ  ects primarily the striking growth in the mean amount of nonhome 
wealth between the two years (not shown in table 3): Nonhome wealth in 2001 was 
higher than its 1989 level by 60 percent. Finally, household production, which has no 
counterpart in EI, also contributed positively to the change in the LIMEW.
The composition of the LIMEW for various years is shown in Figure 1. The most 
notable change is in the income from wealth component: after ﬂ  uctuating in the 
range of 18 to 19 percent in 1989 and 1995, it surged to 24.8 percent in 2000 before 
retreating to 23 percent in 2001. The ﬂ  uctuations largely reﬂ  ect movements in stock 
prices, particularly the bull market of the late 1990s and the stock market collapse 
in 2001. Net government expenditures peaked at 3.4 percent in 1995 and bottomed 
at –0.2 percent in 2000. Although positive in 2001, it was still below its 1989 level, as 
a percentage of the LIMEW and in absolute terms (see Table 3), because of a higher 
tax burden. The share of household production fell from 22.9 percent in 1989 to 20.7 
percent in 2000, before rising to 21.1 percent in 2001.451 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
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2000 54.8 24.8 8.9 8.7 -17.8 20.7












 TABLE  4
  Composition of LIMEW by Quintile, 1989 and 2001
Quintiles Mean  LIMEW  Total  Base  Income  Net government  Household
 (in  2001$)    income  from wealth  expenditures production
   1989
Lowest 24,054  100  52.4  6.9  19.7  20.9
Second 44,534  100  56.1  7.6  13.8  22.5
Third 64,223  100  59.5  8.2  8.2  24.2
Fourth 89,062  100  63.4  10.1  1.7  24.9
Highest 172,038  100  54.9  30.6 -7.1 21.7
   2001
Lowest 25,702  100  63.2  7.0  8.8  21.0
Second 49,404  100  56.6  7.2  14.4  21.9
Third 72,302  100  58.1  8.8  9.8  23.3
Fourth 102,740  100  59.7  11.2 4.2  24.9
Highest 233,479  100  50.7  37.7 -7.0 18.7
It is also interesting to examine how the composition of the LIMEW has changed 
for households in different parts of the distribution because the relative importance of 
individual components can vary across the distribution (Table 4). The most dramatic 
change appeared to have taken place at the bottom and top of the LIMEW distribution. 
At the bottom quintile, the share of net government expenditures declined notably, 452 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
from 19.7 percent of the LIMEW in 1989 to 8.8 percent in 2001. This decline was 
matched by an increase in the share of base income, from 52.4 percent to 63.2 percent 
over the same period. At the top quintile, there was a sizeable increase in the share 
of income from wealth, as it rose from 30.6 percent in 1989 to 37.7 percent in 2001. 
Declines in the relative importance of base income (from 54.9 percent to 50.7 percent) 
and household production (from 21.7 percent to 18.7 percent) accompanied the sharp 
growth in income from wealth at the top. Thus, it appears that the transformation in the 
structure of well-being over the 1990s has played out differently for those at the bottom 
and the top. For those at the bottom, the transformation has meant a greater reliance on 
base income (mainly consisting of labor income) and smaller reliance on net government 
expenditures. On the other hand, for those at the top, income from wealth has become 
signiﬁ  cantly more important than base income and household production. 
 
DISPARITIES IN ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 
The extent of disparities among households grouped according to salient social 
and economic characteristics and how these disparities change over time depend on 
the yardstick used for measuring well-being. In this section, we will discuss group-
ings based on the following characteristics of the householder7: race/ethnicity, marital 
status and sex, and age. Our indicator of disparity between the subgroups within a 
particular grouping (e.g., nonwhite versus whites in the grouping based on race) is 
relative economic well-being, as expressed by the ratio of mean values (e.g., the ratio 
of nonwhite LIMEW to white LIMEW).8 Because the constituent components of the 
LIMEW and ofﬁ  cial measures differ in important ways, we also break down the ab-
solute gap (measured in dollars) in well-being between subgroups into components. 
This is helpful in highlighting whether the sources of disparities differ by well-being 
measure (e.g., how large is the role of income from wealth in accounting for the well-
being gap between whites and nonwhites in the LIMEW as compared to the EI?).
Let us ﬁ  rst consider the trends in racial disparities (Figure 2A). Each bar in the 
ﬁ  gure represents a ratio of mean values using the LIMEW, EI, and MI. Nonwhites are 
at a similar disadvantage in 2000 according to LIMEW or EI: their well-being is only 
77 percent of that of whites 9, while MI shows a still lower relative well-being at 74 
percent. However, the trend in disparity between 1989 and 2000 is notably different 
according to the two measures. The LIMEW indicates a worsening of the relative well-
being of nonwhites while the EI and MI suggests slight improvement (the nonwhite 
mean LIMEW was 83 percent of the whites’ in 1989, as compared to 75 percent for EI 
and 72 percent for MI). A major reason behind the worsening of the relative LIMEW 
of nonwhites is the growing wealth gap: their income from wealth was nearly half of 
whites’ in 1989 (46 percent), but it dropped sharply to a level of only 28 percent in 
2000, thus offsetting the trend toward greater parity in the other components.
The absolute amounts by which the components of the LIMEW and EI differ 
between whites and nonwhites show the distinct role played by the racial wealth 
gap (Figure 2B). In 2001, the average LIMEW for nonwhite households was roughly 
$24,000 less than that for white households while the nonwhite mean EI was lower 
by about $13,000 (numbers associated with bars labeled “Total” in Figure 2B). The 453 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
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nonwhite disadvantage in EI appears to be identical to the deﬁ  cit in base income, with 
the higher amount of taxes that the white households pay canceling out their advan-
tage in income from wealth in EI. In contrast, income from wealth in the LIMEW is 
much higher for whites—the gap is $19,000 in the LIMEW versus $5,000 in EI—and 
explains why the gulf between the two groups in the LIMEW is signiﬁ  cantly larger. 
It is also of note that public consumption favors nonwhites more than whites, largely 
reﬂ  ecting the higher educational expenditures incurred on their behalf due to the 
higher number of children in the average nonwhite household. On the other hand, 
the value of household production is higher for whites as a result of two reasons: (i) 
the average hours of housework done by all adults are higher for white households 
because of the higher number of adults in the average white household; and, (ii) 
the hourly replacement cost of household production is higher for white households 
because of their higher average money income and educational attainment. Taken 
together, the nonwhite-white differences in the imputed value of the two types of 
nonmarket provisioning appear to be similar in size and hence their combined effect 
on the nonwhite–white LIMEW gap   is quite small.
We now turn to disparities among three subgroups based on marital status and 
sex of the householder.10 All three measures show a very high gap in well-being be-
tween families with a single-female householder (“single females”) and families with 
a married householder (“married couples”) and a slight widening of the gap in 2001 as 
compared to 1989. In 2001, single females had an average money income that was only 
half of the married couples; EI and the LIMEW paint a slightly better picture since the 
ratios of mean values between single females and married couples are, respectively, 
0.57 and 0.56. The disadvantage in well-being faced by families with a single-male 
householder (“single males”) relative to married couples is considerably less than the 
disadvantage faced by single females according to all three measures. In 2001, single 
males had an average well-being that was roughly 70 percent of married couples.
The distinct roles played by the individual components in shaping the absolute gap 
between single females and married couples in the LIMEW and EI are highlighted in 
Figure 3B. In 2001, as compared to married couples, the average LIMEW for single 
females was lower by roughly $55,000 and EI was lower by about $30,000.11 The 
disadvantage of single females in base income ($37,000) alone exceeds their shortfall 
in EI. This is further exacerbated by their lower income from wealth as measured in 
EI. The gap between the two subgroups in EI is moderated to a much larger extent 
by taxes rather than government expenditures. The sources of disparity between the 
two groups in the LIMEW appear to be considerably different. Firstly, income from 
wealth in the LIMEW is much higher for married couples—the gap is $26,000 in the 
LIMEW versus $7,000 in EI. Secondly, the extent to which government expenditures 
favor single females over married couples is noticeably higher in the LIMEW—the 
extra expenditures is over $7,000 in the LIMEW versus a mere $308 in EI. This is 
mainly due to the presence of public consumption in the LIMEW. Finally, married 
couples have a substantially higher value of household production (the gap amounts 
to about $14,000) reﬂ  ecting their higher average hours of housework and higher 
hourly replacement cost. 
 We end our discussion of subgroup disparities by examining the gaps in well-be-
ing between households with householders belonging to four age groups. The hump 455 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
 FIGURE  3A
  Disparities between Types of Families, 1989 and 2001
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shape of the age-income relationship (i.e., the 35−64 age group is better off, while the 
youngest and oldest age groups are worse off, compared to the average) appears to 
hold for the ofﬁ  cial measures, but not for the LIMEW (Figure 4A). The relationship 
breaks down for the LIMEW not because the youngest have a higher relative well-be-
ing, but because the elderly ﬁ  nds itself with a somewhat higher relative well-being. 
The mean LIMEW for the elderly was 7 percent higher than the average LIMEW for 
all households. In contrast, the average well-being of the elderly was 77 percent of all 
households according to EI and only 60 percent according to MI.
In absolute terms, the elderly fell behind the average household by nearly $12,000 
in EI while they were ahead of the average household by about $7,000 in LIMEW (Fig-
ure 4B). The difference regarding the picture of the relative well-being of the elderly 
mainly stems from the manner in which income from wealth is reckoned in the two 
measures. The LIMEW includes the annuity value from nonhome wealth as income, 
which is quite high for the elderly owing to a greater amount of accumulated wealth 
and a shorter remaining life expectancy. As a result, the wealth advantage of the 
elderly is more prominent in the LIMEW ($26,000 more than the average household) 
than in EI ($3,000). The other components that are common to both measures—base 
income, transfers and taxes—have similar and predictable effects on the age gap in 
well-being. Base income is the largest contributor to the gap in both measures, with 
the average household earning $36,000 more than the elderly household. Transfers, 
on the other hand, help raise the well-being of the elderly much more than they do so 
for the average households, reﬂ  ecting the large share of age-based entitlement pro-
grams (Social Security and Medicare) in total transfers. Taxes fall much more on the 
average household than on the elderly because of the former’s larger taxable income. 
However, net government expenditures and income from wealth in EI are together 
only able to reduce, but not eliminate, the disadvantage of the elderly relative to the 
average household in EI. Even though household production and public consumption 
favor the average household more than the elderly, the latter’s substantial advantage 
in income from wealth along with favorable net government expenditures helped to 
put them a little ahead of the average household in terms of the LIMEW.
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Our understanding of the degree of inequality in well-being and its changes over 
time depends signiﬁ  cantly on how we measure well-being. In this section, we will de-
scribe the extent to which the level of inequality differs among the various measures. 
Our indicator of inequality will be the Gini coefﬁ  cient.12 We will also discuss, using 
decomposition analysis, how the relative importance of the constituent components of 
the LIMEW and the most comprehensive ofﬁ  cial measure, EI, differ in determining 
the changes in inequality (e.g., how much did base income contribute to the change 
in inequality in the LIMEW versus the change in inequality in EI?). The decomposi-
tion analysis will also allow us to provide estimates of the incremental effects of the 
various components (i.e., how much does a small proportionate change in base income 
contribute to a change in overall inequality?) and how these effects vary between the 
LIMEW and EI.457 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
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  Disparities between the Elderly and Average Household in 
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However, before we embark on an examination of the Gini coefﬁ  cients, it is perhaps 
useful to begin with an overview of the shares of each quintile in aggregate income 
(Table 5). The quintiles of each income measure are deﬁ  ned by ranking households 
according to the amount of that income. Therefore, in general, a given quintile of 
the different measures need not be made up of the same households. Nevertheless, 
it is striking that according to all three measures, the only quintile that experienced 
an increase in their share of aggregate income between 1989 and 2001 was the top 
quintile. The extent of the increase in the top quintile’s share was most pronounced 
in the LIMEW (4.6 percentage points), followed by MI (4.4) and EI (3.1). As for their 
shares in the overall pie, the top quintile fared the best according to MI with a share 
of 50 percent in 2001; the top quintile of the LIMEW had a slightly lower share of 48.3 
percent while the top quintile of EI had an even lower share of 45 percent. Among the 
three measures, the share of the bottom quintile is the highest in the LIMEW (5.3 
percent), followed by EI (4.5) and MI (3.5).
 TABLE  5
  Share of Each Quintile in Aggregate Income, 1989 and 2001
   Quintiles
     1  2  3  4  5
  1989               
LIMEW  6.1 11.3 16.3 22.6 43.7
  MI    3.9  9.7 16.2 24.5 45.6
  EI    5.2 11.4 17.1 24.3 41.9
  2001      
LIMEW  5.3 10.2 15.0 21.2 48.3
  MI    3.5  8.8 14.7 23.1 50.0
  EI    4.5 10.7 16.3 23.4 45.0
Note: Quintiles for each income measure are deﬁ  ned with respect to that income measure. 
The rank order of the income measures according to top quintile shares are also 
reﬂ  ected in their Gini coefﬁ  cients (see Figure 5).13 In 2001, the Gini coefﬁ  cient for MI 
was the highest at 46.4, followed by those for LIMEW (42.6) and EI (40.4). Compared 
to the LIMEW and EI, MI overstates inequality because it is a pretax measure that 
does not fully account for government transfers. Public consumption and household 
production are relatively less unequally distributed, and hence, their inclusion in the 
LIMEW also lowers the degree of LIMEW inequality relative to MI.
The ofﬁ  cial measures and the LIMEW indicate that the distribution of economic 
well-being was more unequal in 2001 than in 1989. The inequality in LIMEW showed 
a greater increase between the two years (5.1 Gini points) than in EI (3.5) and MI 
(4.6). According to the ofﬁ  cial measures, most of the increase in inequality occurred 
during the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s while the increase in LIMEW inequality appears to 
be more evenly spread between the subperiods 1989-1995 and 1995-2001. The higher 
growth in LIMEW inequality is especially interesting because it cannot be accounted 
for solely by rising earnings inequality, the main factor behind the changes in MI 
and EI inequality.14 Since the gap between the Gini coefﬁ  cients for the LIMEW and 
EI are quite close in 1989 (a difference of only 0.6 Gini point) and quite apart in 2001 
(a difference of 2.2 Gini points), it would be instructive to examine how the individual 459 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
components shaped the overall inequality in the two measures over the 1990s. We pres-
ent the results from decomposition analysis for this purpose, with the caveat that such 
analysis is not a substitute for a full causal analysis, but only a useful starting point.
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The idea behind the decomposition analysis is to express the Gini coefﬁ  cient of 
an income measure as the sum of the “contributions” made by its components [Ler-
man, 1999]. We denote y as the income measure and number its components 1, 2, ..., k 




= ∑ 1 . Let gy denote the Gini coefﬁ  cient. Then, the decomposition is
gb y i i
k
=
= ∑ 1 , where bi is the contribution to the Gini made by the component yi. In 
turn, a component’s contribution is calculated as the product of its concentration coef-
ﬁ  cient (ci) and its share in total income (si): bi=cisi [Yao, 1999, 1252–53].15 The results 
of the decomposition analysis for 1989 and 2001 are shown in Table 6.
In order to uncover the proximate causes of the growth in LIMEW inequality 
outstripping the growth in EI inequality, we calculated, from the numbers in Table 5, 
the changes in the contribution made by individual components to the total change in 
the Gini for each measure (Figure 6). Quite clearly, the major drivers of the changes 
in inequality are different in the two measures. Base income played this role in EI 
while income from wealth is the major factor behind the changes in LIMEW inequal-
ity. The difference in their respective roles is, in turn, due to the divergent movement 
in their shares in income that we already discussed in connection with the composi-
tion of the LIMEW and EI (see the discussion of results in Table 3). The share of 
base income in EI rose from 95.5 percent in 1989 to 99.8 percent in 2001, while the 460 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
share of income from wealth in EI declined from 18.3 percent in 1989 to 16.1 percent 
in 2001. The opposite pattern prevailed for the LIMEW: the share of base income 
declined from 57.5 percent in 1989 to 55 percent in 2001, while the share of income 
from wealth rose sharply from 18.3 percent in 1989 to 23 percent in 2001, mainly due 
to the growth in annuities. The latter reﬂ  ected the sharp growth in nonhome wealth 
during the period. 
 TABLE  6
  Decomposition of Inequality by Income Source, 1989 and 2001
                             1989                                                     2001                     
        Share in  Share in    Share in  Share in
        Contribution income  inequality  Contribution income  inequality
      (Gini  points) (percent)  (percent) (Gini  points) (percent)  (percent)
LIMEW
Base  income  20.9 57.5 55.6 21.0  55.0  49.2
Income from wealth  12.6  18.3  33.7  17.3  23.0  40.6
  Imputed  rent  2.0 4.5 5.3 1.7  3.6  4.0
  Annuities  10.6 13.7 28.3 15.6  19.3  36.6
Net government expenditures  -4.2  1.4  -11.2  -3.6  0.9  -8.4
  Transfers  0.2 9.0 0.5 0.8  9.5  1.8
  Public  consumption  2.3 9.4 6.1 2.4  9.0  5.6
 Taxes  -6.6  -17.1  -17.7  -6.7  -17.6  -15.8
Household production  8.2  22.9  21.9  7.9  21.1  18.6
Total 37.5  100.0  100.0  42.6  100.0  100.0
Extended Income               
Base income  41.2  95.5  111.6  46.5  99.8  115.2
Income from wealth  9.7  18.3  26.4  8.6  16.1  21.2
  Return on home equity  3.0  7.7  8.2  1.4  5.4  3.5
  Property income plus realized  6.7  10.6  18.2  7.1  10.7  17.7
  capital  gains
Net government expenditures  -14.0  -13.8  -38.0  -14.7  -15.9  -36.4
 Transfers  -0.7  11.4  -1.8  0.0  12.4  -0.1
  Taxes  -13.3 -25.2 -36.2 -14.7  -28.3  -36.3
Total 36.9  100.0  100.0  40.4  100.0  100.0
Note: See text for an explanation of calculation methods
Thus, the difference in the manner in which income from nonhome wealth is 
reckoned in the two measures serves as the main explanation for the faster growth 
in LIMEW inequality. The difference suggests that considering changes in economic 
inequality to be shaped, basically, by earnings inequality (the main component of base 
income) may be misleading. Wealth inequality also plays an important role.
The results of the decomposition analysis also reveal that the part played by net 
government expenditures in determining the level and trend of inequality is quite dif-
ferent between the LIMEW and EI. Net government expenditures considerably reduce 
the overall level of inequality in the LIMEW and EI (the share of net government ex-
penditures in inequality is negative and large, see Table 6). However, the effect of net 
government expenditures is much larger in EI (-36.4 percent in 2001), as compared to 
the LIMEW (-8.4 percent). This difference is mainly due to the inclusion of public con-
sumption in the LIMEW on the government expenditures side, in addition to government 
transfers, thereby making the share of net government expenditures in the LIMEW a 461 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
small positive number (0.9 percent in 2001). In contrast, the EI recognizes only trans-
fers as government expenditures beneﬁ  ting the household and hence the share of net 
government expenditures in EI was a large negative number (-15.9 percent in 2001). 
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Since policy changes in the mix of expenditures and taxes typically operate at 
the margin, it is also useful to look at the incremental effects of these components 
on LIMEW and EI inequality. The incremental effect of a particular component on 
inequality refers to the proportionate change that occurs from a hypothetical, small 
proportionate change in that component, everything else remaining the same.16 Since 
“everything else” does not remain the same, these estimates should be considered a 
rough indication of the relative effects of potential policies on inequality.
The incremental effect of net government expenditures on inequality appears to be 
overstated in EI relative to the LIMEW (Figure 7). Both taxes and expenditures reduce 
EI inequality at the margin. While the inequality-reducing effect of expenditures on 
LIMEW is roughly the same as that on EI, taxes have a negligible effect, in sharp 
contrast to their effect on EI inequality. The differential impact of taxes on the two 
measures is due to the differential relationship between taxes and income at the top 
of the distributions. Households at the top of the EI distribution have taxable income 
as the main source of their income and, therefore, effective tax rates rise as we move 
to higher income levels. In contrast, households at the top of the LIMEW distribution 
have imputed income from wealth (obviously not subject to taxation) as a very sizeable 
portion of their LIMEW.17 Hence the positive relationship between tax rates and income 
breaks down at the top of the LIMEW distribution. As a result, a small proportionate 462 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
increase in taxes for all households will slightly reduce the share in aggregate LIMEW 
of those below the very top and lead to a small increase in overall inequality.
CONCLUSION
The picture of economic well-being is crucially dependent on the yardstick used 
to measure it. Although gross money income (MI), the most widely used ofﬁ  cial mea-
sure, may be suitable for certain purposes, it is an incomplete measure in several 
important ways. The elevation of more comprehensive measures to a status that is 
on par with MI in the ofﬁ  cial scorecard of the economic well-being of U.S. households 
is a sure indication that academic discussion and policy making will be increasingly 
informed by such measures.
The LIMEW is different in scope from the ofﬁ  cial measures. Our measure recog-
nizes that economic well-being depends on public and self provisioning, in addition 
to the command over commodities. In contrast, the ofﬁ  cial measures are restricted to 
measuring the latter. Because we believe that these components are important, we 
have developed a set of estimates that reﬂ  ect their effect and signiﬁ  cance. The LIMEW 
differs from the ofﬁ  cial measures also in its methods, especially in our treatment of 
income from wealth and noncash transfers (see Table 1). These differences are more 
than formulae, since they are the result of alternative concepts of economic well-being 
[Wolff, Zacharias, and Caner, 2004, 7:9; Wolff and Zacharias, 2003].
The differences in scope and method lead to substantially different ﬁ  ndings regard-
ing economic well-being. The median U.S. household appears to be much better off 
in 2001 than in 1989 according to our measure relative to the ofﬁ  cial measures. The 
mean value of the LIMEW also showed a much higher growth over the same period 
than the ofﬁ  cial measures. It appears that the main factor behind the measured dif-
ferences in the trend of economic well-being is the differences in the composition of the 
measures. While the composition of the LIMEW has changed in favor of income from 
wealth, there has been no such change in the most comprehensive ofﬁ  cial measure, 
EI. However, the compositional change over the 1990s differed between the top and 
bottom quintiles of the LIMEW. Households at the bottom have become more reliant 
on base income (mainly consisting of labor income) and less on net government ex-
penditures. On the other hand, for those at the top, income from wealth has become 
signiﬁ  cantly more important than base income.
The LIMEW also provides a different picture of disparities among population 
subgroups. Racial disparities have increased between 1989 and 2001 according to the 
LIMEW, while the ofﬁ  cial measures show slight improvement. The worsening of the 
racial gap is traceable, mainly, to the considerable and growing disadvantage faced 
by nonwhites in wealth ownership. As for single females, the LIMEW and the ofﬁ  cial 
measures show a very high gap in well-being between them and married couples. 
However, the sources of disparity between the two groups in the LIMEW appear to 
be considerably different as it is shaped by the complex interaction of advantages and 
disadvantages in income from wealth, net government expenditures and household 
production. In contrast, the disparity between the groups in EI is largely a reﬂ  ection 
of the gaps in their labor income. The hump shape of the age-income relationship (i.e., 463 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
the 35−64 age group is better off, while the youngest and oldest age groups are worse 
off, compared to the average) appears to hold for the ofﬁ  cial measures, but not for the 
LIMEW. The elderly are slightly better off than the average household in 2001 because 
of greater income from wealth owing to a greater amount of accumulated wealth and 
a shorter remaining life expectancy. Our results suggest that the relevant problem, 
both analytically and in terms of public policy, is to investigate the forces behind the 
disparities in individual components, which we plan to address in future research.
The differences with respect to which components and how they are included in 
the measure of well-being also play a crucial role in the analysis of overall economic 
inequality. While all measures considered here indicate a growth in inequality over 
the 1990s, the LIMEW shows the largest increase. Decomposition analysis sug-
gested that the higher growth in LIMEW inequality is due to the sharp growth in 
the contribution to inequality made by income from wealth. The latter reﬂ  ected the 
solid growth in nonhome wealth over the 1990s, especially for those at the top of the 
LIMEW distribution. Our analysis also indicates that while net government expen-
ditures have an inequality-reducing effect for both measures, the EI overstates the 
effect, as compared to the LIMEW. A more important ﬁ  nding from a policy standpoint, 
perhaps, is the asymmetric incremental effect of taxes on inequality between the two 
measures: Taxes have a large negative effect that is similar to government spending 
in EI, while government spending appears to have a much larger inequality-reducing 
effect than taxes in the LIMEW.
Several issues related to economic well-being require further research and evalu-
ation. We hope that our analysis will lead to further academic and policy research and 
will stimulate a rethinking of public policies that affect well-being.
  APPENDIX: SOURCES AND METHODS
Introduction
Our main data source is the public-use data ﬁ  les developed by the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Demographic Supple-
ment (ADS), which is the most comprehensive source of annual information regard-
ing household income, housing tenure, receipt of noncash transfers, and a number of 
key demographic characteristics of U.S. households. The number of households was 
59,941 in 1989 and 78,265 in 2001. The ADS contains either partial or no information 
on imputed income from wealth, government transfers, public consumption, taxes, 
and household production. Therefore, we impute values for these components based 
on additional information.
The component of the LIMEW that is also part of the ofﬁ  cial deﬁ  nition of money 
income is called “base money income”—money income less property income (the sum 
of dividends, interest, and rent) less government cash transfers, as reported in the 
ADS. Roughly 95 percent of base money income consists of earnings. Another compo-
nent of the LIMEW that is taken directly from the ADS (though not included in the 
ofﬁ  cial measure of income) is the imputed value of employer contributions to health 
insurance. Our estimation of the remaining ﬁ  ve components of the LIMEW is brieﬂ  y 
described below.464 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Imputed Income from Wealth
Our data source for household wealth is the 1989, 1995 and 2001 waves of Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF), conducted by the Federal Reserve Board. For these 
years the survey collected data for 3,134 and 4,442 households, respectively. We use 
marketable wealth (or net worth) as our wealth concept, which is deﬁ  ned as the cur-
rent value of all marketable or fungible assets less the current value of debts. Total 
assets are the sum of (1) the gross value of owner-occupied housing; (2) other real 
estate owned by the household; (3) cash and demand deposits; (4) time and savings 
deposits, certiﬁ  cates of deposit, and money market accounts; (5) government bonds, 
corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other ﬁ  nancial securities; (6) the cash surrender 
value of life insurance plans; (7) the cash surrender value of pension plans, including 
IRAs, Keogh, and 401(k) plans; (8) corporate stock and mutual funds; (9) net equity 
in unincorporated businesses; and (10) equity in trust funds. Total liabilities are the 
sum of mortgage debt, consumer debt (including auto loans), and other debt.
We assign net worth by statistical matching to the households in the ADS. Each 
household record in the SCF is matched with a household record in the ADS, where a 
match represents a similar unit. The strata variables used in the matching procedure 
are race of the household head (white versus nonwhite), homeownership status of the 
household (owner or buyer versus renter), family type (married couple, single male, or 
single female), and age of the household head (age differences within a range of two, 
ﬁ  ve, and ten or more years). Within these strata, records are matched by minimizing 
a distance function based on education and occupation of the household head and 
total income and size of the household. The weights of the distance function are the 
coefﬁ  cient estimates from an OLS regression of net worth that includes, as regressors, 
all of the variables mentioned above. 
Home and nonhome wealth are treated separately in the imputation process. In 
the case of home wealth, imputed rent is the replacement cost of services derived from 
owner-occupied housing. We estimate this amount by distributing the total amount of 
imputed rent on nonfarm, owner-occupied housing in the GDP [NIPA table 8.21, line 
172] to homeowners in the ADS based on the (gross) imputed value of their houses. 
In the case of nonhome wealth, we estimate the constant lifetime annuity ﬂ  ow gener-
ated by each nonhome wealth component using average total real rates of return for 
each component from 1960 to 2000. In the next step we calculate the weighted sum 
of the annuity ﬂ  ows for each household with the portfolio shares of the components 
serving as weights. The annuity amount calculated is such that nonhome wealth is 
exhausted at the end of the wealth-holder’s life.18
Government Transfers
Government transfers in the LIMEW are “NIPA consistent,” in the sense that, in 
aggregate, they are equal to the appropriate NIPA benchmarks, after adjusting for 
differences in deﬁ  nition and coverage [Wolff, Zacharias, and Caner, 2004, 21]. 
Transfers for which actual or imputed amounts are reported in the ADS are ag-
gregated across recipients and compared against the benchmarks.19 Any discrepancy 465 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
between the ADS total and the NIPA benchmark for a given transfer payment is dis-
tributed across recipients according to the distribution of that payment in the ADS.
Transfers for which there are no actual or imputed amounts reported in the 
ADS can be divided into two categories: those where recipients are identiﬁ  ed in the 
ADS itself, and those where we imputed recipiency. The ﬁ  rst category consists of the 
noncash component of public assistance; the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) 
program; and employment and training. Noncash public assistance is distributed 
across households according to the number of “cases” per household (the sum of those 
reporting cash public assistance, of children receiving publicly assisted childcare, and 
of those reporting receipt of transportation assistance). Expenditures on WIC are 
distributed equally among the recipients. Expenditures on employment and training 
are distributed equally among those receiving job training or attending school to get 
the General Equivalency Diploma (GED). The second category consists of military-
related transfers (veterans’ life insurance, medical payments for retired and active 
armed forces personnel and their dependents at nonmilitary facilities), and payments 
to nonproﬁ  t institutions. Potential beneﬁ  ciaries from military-related transfers are 
identiﬁ  ed using demographic information from the ADS, and these expenditures are 
divided equally among the beneﬁ  ciaries. Payments to nonproﬁ  t institutions are as-
sumed to be incurred on behalf of the entire population and distributed equally.
All of the transfers discussed in the previous paragraph (with the exception of the 
noncash component of public assistance, which did not exist at the time) had to be 
distributed on the basis of imputed recipiency in 1989 and 1995, because the survey 
did not ask recipiency questions. To identify the potential WIC beneﬁ  ciaries, we ap-
proximated the federal eligibility criteria (families with income up to 185 percent of 
the poverty-line and with children under 6 years of age) and divided the expenditures 
equally among them. Expenditures on employment and training were divided equally 
among adults receiving cash public assistance and those in training, but wanting a 
regular job. 
Public Consumption
Estimates of public consumption by households were constructed in three steps: (1) 
obtaining total expenditures by function and level of government; (2) allocating total 
expenditures between the household sector and other sectors of the economy; and (3) 
distributing expenditures allocated to the household sector among households.
Expenditure by Function and Level of Government. 
The expenditure category used here is government consumption expenditures 
and gross investment (the same as that on the product side of the NIPA). To group 
expenditures according to purpose, we adopted the functional classiﬁ  cation in NIPA 
with minor modiﬁ  cations.
We distributed the NIPA aggregate of state and local expenditures for each func-
tion among the states using the interstate distribution of these expenditures in the 
Annual Survey of Government Finances (ASGF) conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census in 1989 and 2000. Care was taken to ensure that the expenditure concept and 466 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the groupings of the functions in the ASGF conform as closely as possible to the NIPA 
expenditure and function concepts.
Allocation of Expenditures to the Household Sector. 
We started by constructing a schema of 44 functions by level of government (fed-
eral versus state and local).21 Then, we grouped these functions into three categories. 
The ﬁ  rst involved activities that do not expand the potential amenities available to 
the household sector. General public service, national defense, law courts and prisons 
are prominent examples. The second category included functions that are assumed to 
expand amenities directly only to the household sector, such as income security and 
recreation and culture. 
The third category consisted of functions that can potentially serve both the 
household and nonhousehold sectors, such as economic affairs and housing and com-
munity services. Costs incurred in the performance of these functions are allocated 
to the household sector in accordance with the extent that they are “responsible” in 
generating such costs. Our judgment regarding the extent of responsibility is based on 
the available empirical information, as much as possible. A prominent example of this 
type of function is highways (included under economic affairs), where approximately 
60 percent of expenditures were estimated to occur on behalf of households. 
Distribution of Allocated Expenditures among Households. 
After determining government expenditures allocated to the household sector 
(i.e., “public consumption”) by function, we distributed them among households. We 
attempted to follow the same principles of direct usage and cost responsibility that 
were employed in splitting total government expenditures between the household and 
nonhousehold sectors. Two major categories of public consumption are distributed 
among households: those distributed equally across persons (such as public health and 
hospitals, police and ﬁ  re) and those distributed according to household-level, or person-
level, characteristics (such as elementary and secondary education, highways). 
The second group of expenditures account for the bulk of public consumption 
(nearly three-quarters). The person-level or household-level characteristics used in 
the distribution procedures, and their corresponding functions, are listed below:
- Amount and type of income: agriculture.
- Type of income received (including receipt of noncash transfers): public housing, 
administrative costs of Medicare, disability, retirement income (Social Security), 
welfare and social services, and unemployment compensation.
- Shares in consumption expenditures: energy, pollution control and abatement, 
postal service, liquor stores, water supply, sewerage and sanitation.
- Enrollment in public educational institutions: education.
- Patterns of vehicle ownership and transportation usage: transportation and 
parking.
- Employment status: occupational safety and health.
Information on the type and amount of income, as well as the employment sta-
tus of individuals, is obtained directly from the ADS. All other characteristics were 
imputed to individuals or households in the ADS sample from information gathered 
from external sources.467 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
Taxes
The estimated household tax burden in the LIMEW consists of federal and state 
individual income taxes, property taxes on owner-occupied housing, payroll taxes 
(employee portion), and state and local consumption taxes (excise and sales). All 
taxes, apart from consumption taxes, have imputed values in the ADS and were 
aligned with their NIPA counterparts by distributing for each tax the discrepancy 
between the NIPA and ADS aggregate among households according to the share of 
each household in the ADS aggregate.
State and local consumption taxes are calculated on the basis of estimates pub-
lished by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy [McIntyre et al., 2003]. The 
publication contains average state tax rates for “General Sales−Individuals” and 
“Other Sales and Excise−Individuals” differentiated for households in each quintile 
of the household income distribution and in selected portions of the top quintile. We 
assigned these average tax rates to households in the corresponding positions in the 
ADS household income distribution. The resulting tax aggregates were lower than the 
NIPA counterparts. Since we had no independent estimate of the household shares 
in the NIPA totals, it was impossible to align the household consumption tax burden 
with any portion of the NIPA. 
Household Production
Our data sources for household production are the Americans’ Use of Time Project 
(AUTP) conducted in 1985, Family Interaction, Social Capital, and Trends in Time 
Use Study (FISCT) conducted during the 1998−99 period and the American Time 
Use Survey (ATUS) conducted in 2003. The ﬁ  rst two surveys were undertaken at the 
Survey Research Center, University of Maryland. These surveys used the time-diary 
method and collected time use, demographic, and economic data for 5,358 and 1,151 
individuals, respectively. ATUS was conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
had a sample size of approximately 20,000 individuals. The list of activities allowed 
us to estimate the total time spent on paid work and on the three main household 
production activities: core production (such as cooking and cleaning), distribution 
(such as shopping for groceries), and childcare (such as caring for babies and reading 
to children). 
Our imputations are based on the AUTP data for 1989, the FISCT data for 1995, 
and the ATUS for 2000 and 2001. We statistically matched each adult record in the 
time-use survey to an adult record in the ADS. Men and women were matched sepa-
rately, because the effects of match variables on the time spent on household produc-
tion vary signiﬁ  cantly by sex. The strata variables used in the matching procedure 
are the dummy variables for being employed and for being a parent. Within these 
strata we match records by minimizing a distance function based on the number of 
children under ﬁ  ve and dummy variables for marital status, unemployment, age, 
education, retirement, being a homemaker (for women). The weights of these variables 
in the distance function are the coefﬁ  cient estimates in a Tobit regression of weekly 
hours of housework on all the variables listed above. Weekly hours were calculated 
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from the time-use surveys to adjust the reported hours for the day of the week that 
the respondent ﬁ  lled out the time diary. 
To impute the value of household production, we used the average hourly wage 
rate for private household employees, which was calculated from the annual ﬁ  le that 
was created by merging the Current Population Survey’s monthly outgoing rotations 
ﬁ  les. The wage rate was deﬁ  ned as usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly 
hours of work. 
We attempted to capture the differences in the quality and efﬁ  ciency of housework 
across households by constructing for each adult in the ADS a performance index that 
consists of years of education, household income, and time availability for housework.20 
The hourly wage rate of private household employees was multiplied by this index to 
derive an estimate of hourly replacement cost for each adult’s housework. The annual 
value of household production for each adult was then calculated as the product of 
the individual’s hourly replacement cost and annual hours of housework. Finally, the 
imputed value of household production at the household level was derived by summing 
the imputed values for all adults in the household.
 
 NOTES
  Our primary debt is to Hyunsub Kum of the Levy Institute for implementing the statistical matching 
algorithms used in creating our synthetic data ﬁ  le. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments 
and advice of Dimitri Papadimitriou and Rania Antonopoulos and the able research assistance of 
Melissa Mahoney. We have also beneﬁ  ted from comments by Sheldon Danziger, Peter Gottschalk, 
Stephen Jenkins, David Levine, Lars Osberg, Juliet Schor, and Daniel Weinberg. Comments from 
two anonymous referees also helped improve the paper. We remain responsible for all errors.
1.  For details regarding the data sources and methods used to estimate these components, see the Ap-
pendix.
2.  This is consistent with the approach adopted in most national income accounts.
3.  Our rationale for employing this method is that it is a better indicator of the resources available to the 
wealth holder on a sustainable basis over the expected lifetime compared to the bond-coupon method. 
The latter assumes away the differences in individual household overall rates of return caused by dif-
ferences in household portfolios. More importantly for our purposes here, it assumes that the amount 
of wealth remains unchanged over the expected (conditional) lifetime of the wealth holder.
4.  The rate of return used in our procedure is real total return (the sum of the change in capital value 
and income from the asset, adjusted for inﬂ  ation). For example, for stocks, total real return would be 
the inﬂ  ation-adjusted sum of the change in stock prices plus dividend yields.
5.  In the case of Medicare and Medicaid—by far the biggest items in this list—the relevant cost is the 
“insurance value” differentiated by risk classes.
6.  The third-party principle is sometimes ambiguous in the case of such personal care activities as shav-
ing (see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [1995, 11]).
7.  In the survey, the householder is deﬁ  ned as the person in whose name the housing unit is rented or 
owned. If there is joint ownership or tenancy, one of the parties is chosen at random as the house-
holder.
8.  We prefer to use the mean values rather than median values because it allows us to decompose the 
difference between subgroups into individual components.
9.  “Whites” are deﬁ  ned here as non-Hispanic whites. “Nonwhites” refer to everyone else.
10.  We include only family households in this comparison, thus leaving out households with only one 
person and households with only unrelated individuals (e.g., roommates or unmarried partners).469 LIMEW, UNITED STATES, 1989 – 2001
11.  The size of the difference can perhaps be appreciated by considering the following statistic, based on 
the same survey: In 2001, the median annual earnings of average full-time, full-year, male worker 
were $38,275 and the corresponding mean value was $54,061.
12.  We have examined the patterns of inequality using other indicators of inequality (e.g., the Atkinson 
index). However, since the patterns do not appear to be sensitive to the indicator employed, we prefer 
to use the most widely used indicator, i.e., the Gini.
13.  The Gini coefﬁ  cient is an index that ranges from zero (perfect equality) to one (maximal inequality). 
Here we report values that are 100 times the Gini coefﬁ  cient.
14.  Changes in survey design and raising the thresholds for reported earnings introduced in 1994 are 
estimated to raise the measured inequality in money income. One estimate is that these changes ac-
counted for half of the increase in the inequality in household money income between 1992 and 1993 
or about one Gini point [Ryscavage, 1995].
15.  The concentration coefﬁ  cient is similar to the Gini coefﬁ  cient. The Gini coefﬁ  cient is the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line multiplied by 2, while the concentration coefﬁ  cient is the area 
between the concentration curve and the 45-degree line multiplied by 2. The Lorenz curve plots the 
cumulative proportion of income on the vertical axis and the cumulative proportion of households on 
the horizontal axis, with the cumulative proportions calculated after ordering households according 
to income (starting from the lowest and ending with the highest). Suppose we plot the cumulative 
proportion of a component of income (e.g., wages), keeping the same ordering of households on the 
horizontal axis. The curve connecting all points plotted is the concentration curve for wages.
16.  The incremental effect of a component is calculated as the difference between the share of that com-
ponent in inequality and its share in income.
17. According  to  the estimates in Table 4, the share of income from wealth in the LIMEW of the top quintile 
was 37.7 percent in 2001. As one would expect, the share of income from wealth is much higher for 
the higher portions of the top quintile.
18.  In the case of households with multiple adults, life expectancy is the maximum of life expectancies 
of the head of household and spouse. Information on remaining lifetimes is taken from the tables on 
vital statistics (U.S. Census Bureau 2002, Table 93).
19.  The only exception to this procedure was educational assistance, for which we lacked information to 
split the NIPA amount between recipients residing in households and student-housing. Hence, no 
modiﬁ  cation was made to the amount reported in the ASEC.
20.  Years of education and household income are available in the ADS. We calculated time available for 
housework by deducting weekly hours of rest (assumed to be 56) and usual weekly hours of work from 
the total hours in a week. Although the latter variable is available in the ADS, we used the imputed 
amount from the time-use survey in the calculation to ensure that the weekly hours spent on all 
activities do not exceed the total hours in a week.
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